The Scenery of Knowledge"s Language-Game
in Wittgenstein"s Philosophical Investigations by Flores H., Luis
  117
The Scenery of Knowledge’s Language-Game  
in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations 
Luis Flores H., Santiago de Chile 
1. Our Claims 
Our purpose is to take into account Wittgenstein’s 
analyses about knowledge in the Philosophical Investiga-
tions, in order to articulate them and elaborate a concept 
of knowledge (Wissen). My first claim is that this is 
possible. My second claim is that the complexity of this 
concept has not been taken into consideration and its 
originality has been misunderstood in the horizon of the 
Philosophy of Mind (Vohra, A. 1986), of Philosophy of 
Psychology (Schulte, J. 1993; Budd, M. 1989). My 
objection is that the analysis of “knowledge” presupposes 
the dissolution of mind and psychology. My third claim 
concerns the interpretation of the verb “to know” from K. 
Bühler’s point of view as a kind of signal (Signal), at least 
in some uses, and as a symbol or an expression in some 
others. This connection concerning “knowledge” has not 
been brought out in, e.g., (Hacker, P.M.S. 1993; von 
Savigny, E. and Scholz, O.R. 1995). 
2. Wittgenstein’s Concept of Knowledge 
Wittgenstein analyzes the use of the word “knowledge” 
(Wissen). Then this word becomes a language-game. That 
is to say, it is applied correctly under certain circum-
stances. All these constitute the scenery (Schauplatz) of 
our language-game. Wittgenstein emphasizes the network 
of actions (Handlungen), which constitute the scenes 
(Szenen) corresponding to every move of the language-
game. Consequently, we do not find out a mere state of 
consciousness, mental process, or experience. Accord-
ingly, the concept of psychology is not sufficient for this 
approach. We need to know in what family of language-
games we learn its use. Wittgenstein also advises: “you 
should consider the occasion and purpose of these 
phrases” (PI p. 221). 
Wittgenstein considers that “to know” has a grammar. 
This one is closely related to that of “can”, “is able to”, and 
also to that of “to understand”. It is a matter of a mastery of 
a technique (PI § 150). In this sense, to know is a 
condition of possibility of the denomination: “One has 
already to know (or to be able to) something in order to be 
capable of asking a thing’s name” (PI § 30). 
Wittgenstein identifies, as one possibility at least, 
knowledge and concept when he says: “Isn’t my knowl-
edge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in the 
explanations that I could give” (PI § 75). 
For Wittgenstein, “to know” is primarily a queer phe-
nomenon. He accepts to consider phenomena as “mental 
processes” (seelische Vorgänge), but these take roots in 
the ground of actions and human body. 
With regard to doubt, “ ‘I know’ may mean ‘I do not 
doubt’ ” (PI p.221). Doubt is not logically excluded from 
knowledge. It belongs to the horizon of knowledge: “but 
does not mean that the words ‘I doubt’ are senseless” (PI 
ibid). 
When does doubt begin?: “if we cut out human behav-
iour, which is the expression of sensation, it looks as if I 
might legitimately begin to doubt afresh” (PI § 288). 
Even knowledge can become belief: “One says ‘I know’ 
where one can also say ‘I believe’ or ‘I suspect’” (PI p.221), 
where we can become convinced (sich überzeugen). 
Paradoxically, knowledge cannot be applied to the 
others: “I can know what someone else is thinking, not 
what I am thinking. It is correct to say ‘I know what you are 
thinking’, and wrong to say ‘I know what I am thinking’” (PI 
p.222). Neither can be applied to sensations: “I cannot be 
said to learn of them. I have them.” (PI § 246). 
For Wittgenstein, there is a particular use of “to know” 
when we say: “Now I know” , “Now I can do it” and so on 
(PI § 151). Concerning an example of series of numbers, it 
“is something that makes its appearance in a moment” (PI 
ibid). We have an assumption (Annahme) that is con-
firmed. And finally, there is the human body as part of the 
scenery: “he watches A writing his numbers down with a 
certain feeling of tension” (PI § 151), or he has perhaps 
the sensation “of a light quick intake startled” (PI ibid). This 
represents a certain pragmatics of human body, which 
exceeds the domain of psyche. Besides, human behavior 
is able to put off-center the psyche: “We can also imagine 
the case where nothing at all occurred in B’s mind (Geist) 
except that he suddenly said ‘Now I know how to go on’” 
(PI § 179). 
3. Taxonomy of knowledge and Bühler’s 
viewpoint 
Wittgenstein distinguishes three cases of use of “to know” 
from the point of view of saying: 
1) “how many feet high Mont Blanc is” (PI § 78). It is 
surprising that one can know something and not be able to 
say it. It is the matter of descriptions: “what we call 
‘descriptions’ are instruments for particular uses” (PI § 
291). For instance, after looking how my finger was 
moving, knowing it is “being able to describe it” (PI p.185). 
This approach concerns Darstellungsfunktion proposed by 
K. Bühler, that is to say, it is a question of symbols.  
2) “how the word ‘game’ is used”. It is disputable that we 
can say it. It concerns a know-how. 
3) “how a clarinet sounds” (PI § 78). There is nothing to 
say: “Certainly not of one like the third” (PI ibid). This case 
is isomorphic to the following use: “I know the direction 
from which the sound comes; for instance, I look in that 
direction” (PI § 185). Concerning sensation, “if we construe 
the grammar of the expression (Ausdruck) of sensation on 
the model of ‘object and designation as irrelevant” (PI § 
293). That is to say, we have here Bühler’s distinction 
between expression (Ausdruck) and symbol (Symbol). Let 
us consider the following case: “if someone whispers ‘It’ll 
go off now’, (…), still his words do not describe a feeling; 
although they and their tone may be a manifestation 
(Äusserung) of his feeling” (PU § 582). In conclusion, we 
have two Bühler’s functions at work: Darstellungsfunktion 
and Ausdrucksfunktion. 
In these three cases, the Appellfunktion of Bühler, 
performed by signals is not applied. Nevertheless, it is 
applied in the Philosophical Investigations. When Wittgen-




stein analyzes the words “I know how to go on”, he 
concludes that there is no description of a mental state, 
but a signal (Signal): “One might rather call them a ‘signal’, 
and we judge whether it was rightly employed by what he 
goes on to do”( PI § 180). Afterwards, Wittgenstein 
interprets the words “Now I now!” (PU p.218) also as a 
signal: “What is the signal for?” (PI ibid).* 
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